Tamala parked alongside him but did not get out of her car. (quoting William Powers and Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence,” 69 Texas L. When Tamala arrived, Childress was already there, standing next to his car with the trunk open. As the reviewing court, we “should not substantially intrude upon the jury's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony.” Vasquez v. Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice REYNA, and Justice DAVIS. Childress came in and told the clerk that Tamala had poured gas on herself, but the clerk didn't believe him; she had seen Childress outside with a bottle of liquid before the incident. A jury found him guilty on both charges and assessed prison sentences of ten and forty-five years, respectively, and a ,000 fine on each. In a factual sufficiency review, we ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, demonstrates either that the proof of guilt is so weak or that conflicting evidence is so strong as to render the factfinder's verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. The store clerk said that Tamala was covering her eyes and crying hysterically as she entered the store; she smelled like gas. Childress was alleged to have poured gasoline on Tamala, his married girlfriend, and then threatened to light it with a lighter. Factual Sufficiency We begin with Childress's third issue, which alleges that the evidence is factually insufficient. She scrambled out of her car's passenger side and ran into the store, with Childress following her. The jury may believe all, some, or none of any witness's testimony. OPINIONMelvin Childress was charged by indictment with two felony offenses: (1) dating violence assault (enhanced); and (2) aggravated assault. Childress then got a container out of his trunk, poured its contents on Tamala through her open car window, and told her, “I'm going to set your bitch ass on fire.” The gasoline blurred and burned her eyes, but she could see that Childress was holding a lighter. Tamala began to leave, and Childress asked her to wait and asked her again where she had been.
“The court reviews the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compares it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact.” Johnson, 23 S. The appellate court “does not indulge in inferences or confine its view to evidence favoring one side of the case. For the State to prove that Childress committed dating violence assault, it was required to prove that Childress intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to another person (by pouring gasoline on her) with whom he had a dating relationship. While at the restaurant, Childress called Tamala several times, and she lied to him, saying that she was still at work. We first note that Childress did not raise this complaint at trial, but he will be excused from the ordinary rules of procedural default “when the undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.” Gonzalez v. Tamala testified that she and Childress met in August of 2005 and, despite Tamala's being married, they formed a dating and sexual relationship. By finding Childress guilty, the jury obviously believed Tamala, and the record in this case warrants our deference to the jury's credibility determination.